If Congress approves, the Trump administration will spend about $750 billion on defense in fiscal year (FY) 2020. The unanswered question is whether that considerable sum will make America and its friends and allies any safer. I fear not.
One reason for this concern is that 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) sets military objectives that are unobtainable, inexecutable, unnecessary, and unaffordable. The Pentagon’s strategy is “to compete, deter, and win” in an “increasingly complex security environment” with China and Russia atop the list of potential adversaries. But how China and Russia are to be defeated is unstated, a deficiency pointedly noted in the report by the Commission on the NDS. “. . . the NDS too often rests on questionable assumptions and weak analysis, and it leaves unanswered critical questions regarding howthe United States will meet the challenges of a more dangerous world.” It goes on to say, “. . . it does not articulate clear approaches to succeeding in peacetime competition or wartime conflict against those rivals. Resource shortfalls, unanticipated force demands, unfilled capability gaps, and other risk factors threaten DOD’s ability to fulfill the central goals of the NDS . . .”
The Pentagon’s long-term spending plan includes: plus-ups for the Army and Marine Corps of some twenty thousand personnel; 355 ships for the Navy; seventy more aircraft squadrons for the Air Force; and expensive Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines and the B-21 stealth bombers to modernize the nuclear deterrent force.
But consider a war with China or Russia. It could be global. Russian doctrine does not distinguish between conventional and nuclear forces in war. China, too, is nuclear armed. Hence, a nuclear war cannot be discounted.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
If war were limited to conventional forces, how the U.S. and its allies would win such a titanic struggle is far from certain. Invading China or Russia is a non-starter. And war would be bloody and costly. Replacing significant battlefield personnel casualties would be a monumental task. Likewise, repairing battle damage and quickly replacing major weapons systems that, in some cases, take years to build are not trivial matters.
Regarding the emphasis on deterrence, U.S. and allied military power did not prevent Russia from seizing Crimea or interfering in U.S. domestic politics. China has claimed and militarized islets in the South China Sea claimed by several other nations. Abrogating the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) gives Russia the opportunity to deploy missiles far more quickly than NATO can respond.
The U.S. needs a powerful, well-equipped, and ready military. But it must have a realistic and affordable strategic foundation—as it did in the Cold War, balancing achievable aims with politically and fiscally affordable means.
Regarding affordability, another danger, as or more serious than any potential adversary, lurks. The prestigious Defense Business Board warned in a series of studies four years ago about the debilitating effect of uncontrolled annual cost growth of as much as 5 to 7 percent for every item from pencils to people to precision weapons. Unless matched by annual spending increases or contained by cost reduction and avoidance measures, uncontrolled cost growth will make sustaining the current U.S. military force impossible, leading to a “hollow” or unready force such as existed following the Vietnam War.
Russian military strategy and doctrine are 21st century variants of the German Blitzkrieg relying on “information warfare.” Information warfare would render an adversary “blind, deaf and dumb” through misinformation, disinformation, misdirection and control of the electronic and visual spectra. Kinetic military forces would then follow-up in support.
Former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis knew that an effective strategy must defeat the enemy’s strategy. Countering the informational and electronic blitzkrieg requires understanding Russia’s strategy. The same applies to China. Fortunately, an appropriate U.S. strategy is in plain sight.
Drawing from the old Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. would provide overall strategic stability with regional states assuming greater local responsibilities. A “porcupine defense” in Europe and a mobile maritime line of defense in the Pacific, in concert with allies and partners, will contain possible aggression. Both defense strategies (and others) are under review as part of an innovative Breaking the Mold project being conducted by the Naval War College under sponsorship of the Under Secretary of the Navy and Vice Chief of Naval Operations. A major conference is scheduled for June.
The U.S. faces two basic choices: change the current defense strategy or continue to spend more money each year to pay the exploding costs of people, technology, and sophisticated weapons. Over time, an alternative containment strategy could meet the demands of a porcupine and mobile maritime defense with a smaller, ready force. The technology exists to support and underwrite these defenses.
A force organized around containment could number about a million active duty personnel—down from the current 1.4 million and cost approximately $600-650 billion annually. Roughly a third (or 300,000) of the force would be deployed or immediately deployable and sufficient to cover an Iranian or North Korean contingency. Another third would be preparing for operations. The remaining third would be in a stand-down period following deployment and could be reactivated quickly in crisis. Each tranche would rotate every 6-7 months.
What would this mean for the Defense Department overall and specifically for the Navy and Marine Corps? A smaller force could defeat both the Russian and Chinese strategies—if the U.S. had the right strategy. More conventional power will not necessarily work.
For the Navy and Marines, 355 ships should not be the aim point. Understanding how naval forces can contain and deter Russia and China is. In NATO, members would seek to procure more unmanned systems and viable short-range anti-air and anti-armor weapons. Local militia forces in the Baltic would turn an invasion from the east into a massive insurgency Russia could not win. During World War II, the Soviet Union deployed nearly a half million troops into those countries largely to maintain control.
The northern, Baltic, and Black Sea theaters would be configured slightly differently because of geography. In the north, the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap would be sealed keeping Russian naval units from breaking out into the Atlantic. The Baltic states would be exemplars of a porcupine defense. Any Russian advances would be badly bloodied.
In the Black Sea, the east coasts of Romania and Bulgaria could adopt the same defenses. Russian attacks could not come from the land unless through Ukraine was. Sea and air would be the main attack vectors. Here unmanned systems and long-range missiles would prove effective. Politically, part of a porcupine defense would be to call for a revision of the Montreux Convention that limits non-contiguous states from free access of warships to the Black Sea. Merely raising such discussions surely would get Moscow’s attention.
Similarly, erecting a defensive perimeter around the first island chain in the Pacific would require more submarines and unmanned systems with carrier strike groups in reserve in a layered offense. With air independent propulsion (AIP) and inherent quietness, some of these boats could be diesel. Likewise, 21st century variants of merchant Q-ships armed with Tomahawk missiles could be deployed to both Asian and European waters.
Marines could reinforce partner nations—including Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines—with longer-range missiles and other unmanned systems. Mines and other systems to blockade would put a check on China. And Marines would be available as the front-line forces for contingencies elsewhere through use of the expeditionary units at sea.
The number of ships is less important than the capacity to contain potential adversaries. Conceivably, seven or eight carrier strike groups could be sufficient. Instead of decommissioning ships and aircraft with available service lives left (such as the recent proposal not to refuel the USS Harry S. Truman [CVN-75]), they could be placed in a caretaker status and brought back to active duty quickly. Instead of designing surface ships that are more capable versions of today’s fleet, unmanned surface vessels, airships and other alternatives must be examined. Even heavier emphasis could be placed on remotely piloted and unmanned vehicles of all types. This would lead to an active duty fleet of about the same size or slightly smaller than today’s, but two or three carrier strike groups and amphibious groups would be in a caretaker or reserve status that would increase numbers in a crisis.
The Navy has signed contracts for two new Gerald R. Ford-class carriers. One advantage of these ships is that in the future if “electric weapons” become feasible, each carrier could generate sufficient power for these advanced systems, which would be revolutionary.
In summary, a containment-based strategy will deter by raising the costs of aggression while also countering so-called “active measures” or non-kinetic and non-military means of expanding influence. It will also prove less expensive than pursuing the elusive aim of defeating China or Russia. And containment will not risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy as defeating a peer enemy could prove.
Long-range missiles will make detection difficult as firing from home waters can reach most potential targets. While the B-21 will likely be a technological marvel, the need for a future penetrating bomber is questionable. A modified jumbo jet that can carry dozens or even hundreds of long-range land-attack missiles would seem more than applicable and affordable.
But make no mistake—the objective to defeat China or Russia in a war is probably unaffordable and unnecessary. Containment works. Denying the enemy his goal works. A redesigned force can do both while preventing a “hollow” military from reoccurring. The choice is ours: fix the strategy or face the consequences.
Big Al thinks that Dr. Ullman makes a good point in this article. How about you?
